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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 90

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 11/06/1997

Where it occurred: Chawni Village, Ali
Khail District, Paktia
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
hard
rocks/stones

Date record created: 24/01/2004

Date last modified: 24/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
request for long handtool (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The
following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for four years. It was three months since he had last
completed a revision course and 43 days since his last leave. The ground where the accident
occurred was described as a hard and bushy hillside beside a river. A photograph showed
small green "bushes" that were 60cm (2') high. The ground appeared to be largely shale and
small stones.
The investigators determined that the victim was working in a bushy clearance lane with
continuous detector readings. Because of the continuous reading, he was digging all of the
area and prodded with excessive force and let off a PMN. They identified the device by "found
fragments". The victim believing that he had touched a tripwire with his bayonet.
The Team Leader said that the deminer was working properly and the mine may have been
tilted. He added that a modern detector that could differentiate close readings would reduce
accidents.
The Section Leader said the victim was working properly and that the mine must have been
on its side. He said greater caution, and greater control from the victim's partner, might
reduce the number of accidents.
The victim's partner said he was working properly, but that the mines were up to 50cm deep
and had changed position.
The victim said he was prodding and working properly. He was not wearing a fragmentation
vest because the team did not have enough. He states that his bayonet pulled a tripwire and
let off a booby trap. He recommended using a long Russian bayonet for prodding.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that either the deminer was squatting to prod and prodded at the
wrong angle or the mine had been placed during floods and was at an angle in the ground.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that deminers must avoid applying excessive force; that
greater care is needed where mines have been moved by floods because their orientation is
uncertain; that the command group should ensure all safety procedures are adhered to; and
that all deminers should wear fragmentation jackets when unable to probe prone.

Victim Report
Victim number: 121

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: 300,000 Rs

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: Helmet, Thin, short
visor

Thin, short visor

2

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Body
minor Hand
minor Legs
minor Neck
minor Shoulders
severe Chest
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as: amputation of right hand at the wrist, deep right
chest injury (subclavicular 4-5cm), superficial wounds on left hand, both shoulders, his neck
and his "thighs".
A sketch showed abrasions to his knees, body, left arm and hand and a fragment hole in his
chest.
A photograph showed upper body injuries and right hand amputation.
The demining group reported that the victim suffered: amputation right forearm (which was
"crushed"), fracture right clavicle and left hand 4th metacarpal, breathing difficulty and a chest
penetration. They reported two months later that the stump had healed, but his left hand and
right shoulder were stiff. His injuries were assessed as a 60% disability. Another document
described his injuries as: traumatic amputation of right hand at wrist, deep chest injury
(subclavicular to 5cm), lacerated wounds to left hand, both shoulders, neck and both legs.
Compensation of 300,000 Rs was forwarded on 6th November 1997.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Unavoidable" because it seems likely that
the victim was working appropriately (within his group's SOPs) when the accident occurred.
The failure of the demining group to provide appropriate detectors, protective equipment or
excavating tools are significant management failings. Use of the short bayonet almost
certainly resulted in more severe injuries than would have occurred with a long tool, and it
seems likely that the chest penetration was caused by a part of the bayonet or its handle (see
accident in Afghanistan on 30th December 1990). The secondary cause is listed as
“Inadequate equipment”.
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" without wearing a frag-jacket was in breach of
UN requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those
requirements. The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP
for local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing.
Their failure to have provided more than two frag-jackets per team made adherence to their
rules impossible.
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The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.

Related papers
The picture below shows a Russian prod held in numbers at the training centre for Afghan
deminers but not used. It is likely that this was to the tool requested. The spectacle-case
alongside illustrates the scale of the tool. The prod at the end can be reversed and stored
inside the handle. The handle can be used at various lengths, including very short.
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